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1 
‘Not … like a rum-ration’: Amphetamine Sulphate, the Royal Navy and the 
evolution of policy and medical research during the Second World War.1 
 
James Pugh, University of Birmingham. Copyright: Author / SAGE / War in 
History. Accepted for publication, March 2016. 
 
In September 1941, the Admiralty issued Confidential Booklet (C.B.) 3062, 
‘Handbook on the Use of Benzedrine’, which provided guidance for Medical 
Officers (MOs) and ship’s captains on the use of amphetamine sulphate, a 
potent stimulant known by its brand name Benzedrine. In so doing, the Royal 
Navy (RN) became the first of Britain’s armed forces to approve the use of the 
drug on operations.2 An exploration of the operational use of Benzedrine across 
Britain’s armed forces will be the subject of a separate article, but in the case of 
the RN, the evidence indicates that the substance was used throughout the 
Service, and across a range of operational settings including convoy work, 
surface engagements, and by submariners, naval aviators and special forces 
personnel.3 It was also used by shipwrecked personnel, and the drug, which 
                                                          
1
 Admiralty, C.B.3062: Handbook on the Use of Benzedrine (London 1941), p.8. Copy held in 
the Admiralty Library, Portsmouth. 
2
 C.B.3062. 
3
 For example, see Imperial War Museum Sound Archive, London, Interview 13650. A. P. 
Morrow, Reel 2. Recorded, 11/12/1993; Interview 11769. C. L. Berey, Reel 2. Recorded 
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had effects in terms of both wakefulness and wellbeing, was included in survival 
kits found in lifeboats and rafts.4 Although it is impossible to comment 
accurately on the scale of use, in the latter role alone, Admiralty figures indicate 
that some 28 million tablets were ordered for the Merchant Navy and RN 
between August 1942 and June 1943.5 As Leslie Iversen, the noted scholar of 
amphetamines has observed, during his time as a conscript in the RN during 
the 1950s, amphetamine was still ‘freely available’, and Benzedrine use in the 
naval context even featured in the climactic scenes of Nicholas Monsarrat’s 
1951 novel, The Cruel Sea.6  
While a relatively niche subject within the history of the RN of the Second 
World War era, it is surprising that so little has been written on Benzedrine 
policy and practice, especially as John Reeve highlighted the ‘naval evidence 
that the ancient link between war and narcotics—epitomised in the age of sail 
                                                                                                                                                                          
17/01/1991; Interview 12097. P. D. Gick, Reel 2. Recorded 20/06/1991; Interview 18574. L. D. 
Sayer, Reel 2. Recorded 05/11/1998; Interview 10180. J. P. Hatfield, Reel 10. Recorded 1988. 
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 Medical Research Council (MRC), A Guide to the Preservation of Life at Sea after Shipwreck 
(London: HMSO, 1943), pp.11–12. Also, see The National Archives, Kew (TNA), Admiralty Files 
(ADM) 116/5509 – Papers of the MRC Committee on the Care of Shipwrecked Personnel.  
5
 TNA, ADM 116/5509 – Letter, Ministry of War Transport (MoWT) to Medical Director General, 
Royal Navy (MDG), 31 August 1942 and Note to MDG, 12 June 1943. The exact figures were 
20,160,000 and 8,120,000 tablets respectively. 
6
 L. Iversen, A Very Short Introduction to Drugs (Oxford: OUP 2001), p.9; N. Monsarrat, The 
Cruel Sea (London: Penguin Books, 2002 [1951]), pp.390–392. On amphetamines more 
generally, see L. Iversen, Speed, Ecstasy, Ritalin: The Science of Amphetamines (Oxford: OUP, 
2006), chapter two. 
3 
by the Royal Navy’s issuing of “grog” — survived into modern times’.7 Of 
course, the relationship between drugs and alcohol is complex, and while the 
cultural acceptability of consuming various psychoactive substances has varied 
over time, alcohol enjoys a prominent place in the history and culture of the 
Royal Navy.8 Thus, it is telling that in developing policy for the use of stimulant 
drugs during the Second World War, researchers declared that Benzedrine 
‘must not be taken … daily like a rum-ration’.9  
The absence of research into naval amphetamine policy is also 
surprising given the renewed interest in the history of drug use in the military 
context and ongoing debates about current use on operations.10 Apart from 
occasional references to the use of amphetamines in the context of survival at 
sea, the issue is discussed in only two sources and these take diametrically 
                                                          
7
 J. Reeve, ‘An Anatomy of the Face of Naval Battle’, in J. Reeve & D. Stevens, eds., The Face 
of Naval Battle (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2003), p.34. 
8
 A. Finlan, The Royal Navy in the Falklands Conflict and the Gulf War: Culture and Strategy 
(London: Frank Cass, 2004), p.16. On the changing cultural acceptability of drug use, see V. 
Berridge, Demons: Our changing attitudes to alcohol, tobacco, & drugs (Oxford: OUP, 2013). 
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 C.B.3062, p.8. 
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 For a recent example, see J. Lewy, ‘The Army Disease: Drug Addiction and the Civil War,’ 
War in History, 21 (January 2014), pp.102–119. On amphetamines specifically, see N. 
Rasmussen, On Speed: The Many Lives of Amphetamines (New York, N.Y.: NYU Press, 2008), 
chapter three; N. Rasmussen, ‘Medical Science and the Military: The Allies’ Use of 
Amphetamine during World War II’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 42 (Autumn 2011), 
pp.205–233; A. Derickson, ‘“No Such Thing as a Night’s Sleep”: The Embattled Sleep of 
American Fighting Men from World War II to Present’, Journal of Social History¸ 41, 1 (Fall 
2013), pp.1 – 26; P. Steinkamp, ‘Pervitin (Metamphetamine) tests, use and misuse in the 
German Wehrmacht’ in Man, Medicine, and the State: The Human Body as an Object of 
Government Sponsored Medical Research in the 20th Century, in W. U. Eckart, ed., (Stuttgart: 
Franz Steiner Verlag, 2006), pp.61–71. In the modern context, see J. A. Caldwell, ‘Go Pills in 
Combat: Prejudice, Propriety, and Practicality’, Air and Space Power Journal, 22 (Fall 2008), 
pp.97–104. 
4 
opposed viewpoints.11 Nicholas Rasmussen, a historian of amphetamines and 
science, noted that, amphetamines were ‘useful for situations such as long, high 
alert watches on convoy escort missions and that objectionable side effects 
were rare’. In contrast, the Navy’s official history stressed the variable opinion of 
RN MOs about the drug based upon its potentially negative effects, which 
included insomnia and the physical and mental strain it could place on 
individuals after use.12 It is also unclear from the historiography if the RN utilised 
the drug to help manage wakefulness or, as Rasmussen and Martin Francis 
have argued in the case of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and British Army, as a 
frontline ‘psychiatric medication’ or a ‘mood enhancer’ to help with the 
psychological strains of combat.13 
Pointing to wider themes, John Reeve has observed that cultural bias, 
operational factors and practical challenges have limited the historical focus on 
the ‘human factor’ in naval warfare during the modern era.14 While naval 
historians have made great strides addressing this subject, including the work of 
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 J. Coulter, The Royal Naval Medical Service (RNMS), Vol.I: Administration (London: HMSO, 
1954), p.177; J Coulter, RNMS, Vol.II: Operations (London: HMSO, 1957), p.362 and fn; G. H. 
Bennett & R. Bennett, Survivors: British Merchant Seaman in the Second World War (London: 
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 Rasmussen, On Speed, p.66; Coulter, RNMS, Vol.II, p.362. 
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 Rasmussen, ‘Medical Science and the Military’, p.212; Rasmussen, On Speed, pp.58, 61, 
62–64, 63–66, 71, 82; M. Francis, The Flyer: British Culture and the Royal Air Force, 1939 – 
1945 (Oxford: OUP 2008), p.121. 
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 J. Reeve, ‘Anatomy’, pp.6–9. 
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Ronald Spector, Christopher McKee, Brian Lavery and Glyn Prysor, relatively 
little is known about the RN’s medical or psychologically focused activities 
during the Second World War; with the obvious exceptions of work by Edgar 
Jones and Neil Greenberg and by Alastair Goddard.15 While data about 
Benzedrine use in the operational sphere is lacking, including restrictions on 
sensitive medical data, there is significant material available relating to the 
Navy’s internal policy / medical discussions and there is some limited evidence 
available from the experimental operational context.16 
As such, the article, while building what is an unknown narrative, seeks 
to illuminate an aspect of the medical / human dimension to naval warfare by 
examining the evolution of the RN’s policy governing the use of amphetamines. 
This process is placed in the wider context of medical research within the 
Service, including the creation of the Royal Naval Personnel Research 
Committee (RNPRC). Indeed, the RN was the last of the three Services to 
establish a personnel research committee, and the organisation’s medical 
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 R. H. Spector, At War at Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century (London: 
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pp.52–66. 
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 The restricted files are found in TNA, ADM 101. 
6 
research efforts during the first two years of the conflict were described by its 
own Medical Director General (MDG), Surgeon Vice-Admiral Sheldon Dudley, 
as ‘haphazard’.17 The article investigates why the Navy was able to push ahead 
of the other services in terms of drug policy, arguing that cultural, medical and 
operational factors affected this process. These included the Navy’s 
independent organisational culture, the presence of MOs on ships to provide 
direct control and supervision over the drug and the nature of naval warfare in 
which crews could operate for days at a time without any prospect of respite. 
In turn, the article considers the effect of the RNPRC on the evolution of 
amphetamine policy, which included recommendations to loosen control of the 
drug, reflecting what was seen as the Navy’s overly restrictive policy. Finally, 
the article demonstrates how the Navy’s approach serves to support or 
challenge wider historiographical perspectives about the British use of 
amphetamines during the conflict, indicating that the RN approved Benzedrine 
for use on operations to help personnel sustain wakefulness during lengthy 
operations. Researchers were impressed with Benzedrine’s wellbeing related 
effects, especially in the context of survival at sea, but there were genuine 
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 TNA, ADM 1/12150 – Minute, Medical Director General, Royal Navy (MDG) to Director of 
Scientific Research, Royal Navy, 12 February 1942. 
7 
concerns over the drug’s negative and subjective effects, and its use was to be 
restricted to ‘exceptional circumstances’.18 
 
Rasmussen provided a US-centric early history of amphetamines, including 
Benzedrine Sulphate, the brand marketed and sold by the US pharmaceutical 
company, Smith, Kline and French.19 In Britain, the appearance of Benzedrine 
was met with genuine enthusiasm in two leading medical publications, The 
Lancet and the British Medical Journal. This included articles that focused on 
the drug’s value as an aid to wakefulness, particularly in the treatment of 
narcolepsy, and further evidence relating to the drug’s effects on wellbeing, 
including a positive impact on both confidence and concentration. In spite of 
initial enthusiasm, the medical press was careful to stress the novelty of the 
drug, its subjective qualities and the importance of retaining close professional 
(medical and pharmaceutical) control over the substance.20 Given the over-
enthusiastic and at times hysterical response of the British lay press to 
Benzedrine, typified by the Daily Express stressing its risks and values in a self-
sustaining double-helix-like narrative, a political response to the drug was 
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 C.B.3062, p.3. 
19
 Rasmussen, On Speed, chapters one and two. 
20
 ‘Benzedrine in Narcolepsy’, British Medical Journal (BMJ), 1 (15 February 1936), p.27; W. 
Sargant and J. M. Blackburn, ‘The Effect of Benzedrine on Intelligence Scores’, The Lancet, 22 
(12 December 1936), pp.1385–1387; ‘Use and Abuse of Benzedrine’, BMJ, 2 (25 September 
1937), pp.625–626. 
8 
inevitable and the substance came to be controlled under an Amendment 
(1938) to the Poisons List.21 By placing access to the drug in the hands of both 
medical and pharmaceutical professionals, such legislation served to further the 
British government’s drug-related policy objectives during this period by helping 
to strengthen and legitimise both professions.22  
In the case of the RN, Benzedrine’s potential for use in the treatment of 
seasickness had been highlighted in several reports since 1937, including an 
article in the Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Service (JRNMS).23 While 
repeating the warnings found in mainstream medical journals, including the 
drug’s variable effects, the JRNMS article was important because it 
demonstrated the promise of Benzedrine while appearing in a RN specific 
source with which MOs within the Navy were encouraged to engage.24 Further 
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 Daily Express, 30 June 1936, p.10; Daily Express, 2 July 1936, p.3; Daily Express, 3 July 
1936, p.3; Daily Express, 15 May 1937, p.3; Daily Express, 17 May 1937, p.7; Daily Express, 24 
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May 1938; Daily Express, 8 September 1938, p.11; TNA, HO 45/23066 – Letter, Home Office to 
Local Governments, 22 December 1938; London Gazette, 23 December 1938, p.8175. 
22
 On British drug policy during this period, see P. Bean, The Social Control of Drugs (London: 
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chapters eight to twelve; J. H. Mills, Cannabis Nation: Control and Consumption in Britain, 
1928–2008 (Oxford: OUP, 2012), chapters two and three; Berridge, Demons, chapters four to 
nine. 
23
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Sickness’, Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Service (JRNMS), 24 (July 1938), pp.219–222; 
‘Benzedrine’, BMJ, 2 (1 July 1939), p.25; R. J. Blackham, ‘Sea-Sickness’, BMJ, 2 (22 July 
1939), pp.166–167. 
24
 TNA, ADM 182/102 – Admiralty Fleet Orders (AFO) 431/40, ‘Journal of the Royal Naval 
Medical Service – Articles for Publication’, 8 January 1940. 
9 
mention of the drug occurred in July 1940 when Surgeon Captain Macdonald 
Critchley, who would investigate Benzedrine use in the context of survival and 
convoy operations later in the war, noted the use of the substance in helping 
those with narcolepsy.25 Thus, by mid-1940, RN MOs were likely aware of 
Benzedrine and the polarising narrative that engulfed the substance, stressing 
both the potential and pitfalls of the drug.  
 
Both Richard Davenport-Hines and Rasmussen suggested that it was the 
German use of the amphetamine ‘Pervitin’ during the summer of 1940, which 
helped stimulate the interest of Britain’s armed forces in the use of 
amphetamines in the operational context; a contention confirmed in the case of 
the RN.26 For example, on 5 November 1940, Sir Edward Mellanby, Secretary 
of the MRC, wrote to Surgeon Vice-Admiral Sir Percival Nicholls, then serving 
as MDG, to highlight the potential of Benzedrine and its ‘allies for war 
purposes’. Mellanby noted that the psychological and physiological reaction to 
such drugs was being explored by both the Air Ministry and researchers at 
Cambridge, and he invited the MDG to consider undertaking similar research to 
investigate the drug in relation to specific ‘naval problems’. Mellanby took a 
                                                          
25
 M. Critchley, ‘Disorders of Nocturnal Sleep in Narcoleptics’, JRNMS, 26 (July 1940), p.247. 
26
 R. Davenport-Hines, The Pursuit of Oblivion: A Global History of Narcotics, 1500 – 2000 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001), p.243; Rasmussen, ‘Medical Science and the Military’, 
p.212. Also, see TNA, Medical Research Council (MRC) Files (FD) 1/6377 – Letter, Sir Henry 
Dale to Sir Edward Mellanby, 29 June 1940 and Letter, Dale to Mellanby, 2 July 1940. 
10 
cautious tone and acknowledged that Nicholls felt the whole subject ‘bristled 
with difficulties’.27 While no evidence exists of what Nicholls meant by such 
difficulties, it is possible to highlight three issues that surrounded drug research 
in the RN. In the first instance, practical difficulties were evident in the testing of 
drugs, including developing exercises by which the effects of the Benzedrine, a 
drug with extremely subjective effects, could be measured and quantified in a 
laboratory setting. Such difficulties were only exacerbated when attempting to 
obtain scientific data during operational testing, and Rasmussen questioned the 
rigour and objectivity of the testing that took place in both the British Army and 
RAF.28 
These difficulties also encompassed wider ethical and moral 
considerations relating to the use of drugs, concerns highlighted by the RAF in 
September 1939 and by the MRC 12 months later. For example, Mellanby 
observed that, ‘we should have to think twice before we recommended drugging 
troops and, unless the advantages are very great or become great under certain 
specified conditions, our natural inclination would probably be to turn them 
down’.29 Similar sensitivities were raised by the RAF, and its Director of 
                                                          
27
 TNA, FD 1/6377 – Letter, Mellanby to Royal Navy Medical Director General (MDG), 5 
November 1940. Benzedrine’s ‘allies’ included other stimulant drugs such as methedrine and 
ephedrine. On comparisons between these substances, see TNA, FD 1/2596 for work 
conducted by the MRC between 1936 and 1939. 
28
 For example, see Rasmussen, ‘Medical Science and the Military’, p.214. 
29
 TNA, FD 1/6377 – Letter, Sir Edward Mellanby to Professor F. L. Golla, 5 September 1940 
11 
Operational Requirements, Group Captain Robert Saundby, urged caution over 
the use of the word ‘drug’ fearing it ‘might conceivably cause misunderstandings 
among our own people, or even serve as material for enemy propaganda’.30 No 
evidence appears to exist of such concerns in the Navy, at least not from policy 
makers, but it was clear that the use of drugs in the operational context was a 
contentious issue. 
Difficulties also existed in the organisational sphere and there were 
debates about the conduct and coordination of personnel / medical research in 
the Service. Lord Hankey, writing to the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff (VCNS), 
Vice-Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, in his capacity as Chairperson of the Scientific 
Advisory Committee, suggested an expansion of the Air Ministry’s FPRC to 
encompass research for all three Services. This would include a joint committee 
to investigate issues relevant to all Services and specific sub-committees to 
explore those unique to each Service. The wider goal included a desire to pool 
resources and to avoid duplication of effort, and senior officers within the Navy, 
including Nicholls, were seemingly enthusiastic about Hankey’s ideas.31 Other 
minutes submitted to the VCNS indicated a more reticent attitude, and it was felt 
that a separate research committee was unnecessary given both the existing 
                                                          
30
 TNA, Air Ministry Files (AIR) 2/4172 – Minute, Director of Operational Requirements to 
Director of the RAF’s Medical Services, 13 September 1939. 
31
 TNA, ADM 1/11912 – Letter, Lord Hankey to Vice Chief of the Naval Staff (VCNS), 30 
October 1940, and Minute, MDG, 28 November 1940. 
12 
medical and psychological research being undertaken in the RN.32 However, 
the idea to seek an expansion of the FPRC to include naval matters gained 
favour with the Admiralty, and the First Lord, A. V. Alexander, approached the 
Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, along such lines in early 1941. 
While Sinclair was happy to expand the efforts of the FPRC to include naval 
matters, the Air Ministry made clear its desire to retain sole-control over the 
FPRC. Although this move fell short of Hankey’s desire to see a tri-service 
‘Defence Services Personnel Committee’ and a naval sub-committee, 
cooperation with Army and RAF-specific committees provided access to 
ongoing research into the use of stimulant drugs, with papers reaching VCNS 
that referenced the FPRC’s work on ‘certain drugs … for lessening the fatigue 
of aircrews’.33 
Prior to this agreement, the RN had a representative on the FRPC, 
Surgeon Commander J. Graff, and in his letter to Nicholls, Mellanby noted he 
had mentioned the subject of drug research to Graff during an FPRC meeting.34 
The evidence indicates that Nicholls liaised with Mellanby regarding research 
                                                          
32
 TNA, ADM 1/11912 – Minute, unknown to VCNS, 10 January 1941. 
33
 TNA, ADM 1/11912 – Air Ministry to Scientific Advisory Committee, ‘Survey of Scientific 
Activities in the Air Ministry’, 24 October 1940, Annex III, 27, Letter, First Lord of the Admiralty to 
Secretary of State for Air, 28 February 1941 and Letter, Secretary of State for Air to First Lord of 
the Admiralty, 6 March 1941. 
34
 TNA, FD 1/6377 – Letter, Mellanby to MDG, 5 November 1940. TNA, AIR 57/40 – FPRC 
Minutes, 4 October 1939. Graff was formally welcomed to Committee during this meeting, but 
the minutes would not record his involvement in Benzedrine related discussions until August 
1941. 
13 
into Benzedrine and in January 1941, Mellanby was able to notify the former 
that the MRC would be able to provide the Navy with a researcher to investigate 
the specific problems of Benzedrine use in the RN.35 During March 1941, the 
researcher, Dr Norman Mackworth, undertook ‘field investigations at Aberdeen 
and Scapa Flow into the possible uses of this substance in the Royal Navy’, 
submitting a report, ‘The Use of Benzedrine in the Royal Navy’, in April / May 
1941.36 Unfortunately, a copy of Mackworth’s report, which included details of 
operational research with minesweepers, is not found in the archives, and the 
absence of the document from MRC, Air Ministry, War Office or Admiralty files 
is indicative of the convoluted and somewhat confused administrative nature of 
medical research in the Navy during this period.37 Rather than submitting his 
research to the MRC, it appears Mackworth went directly to the Admiralty, even 
though the MRC provided the oversight and funding for his research. In turn, the 
Admiralty seized upon the research as a product of ‘their own initiative’, much to 
the annoyance of Mellanby and Professor F. C. Bartlett, a psychologist and 
                                                          
35
 TNA, FD 1/6377 – Letter, Mellanby to MDG, 31 January 1941. 
36
 TNA, FD 1/4148 – Staffing, MRC Unit at Cambridge. Letter, Mackworth to MRC, 28 August 
1941, p.2; N. H. Mackworth, MRC Special Report No.268: Researches on the Measurement of 
Human Performance (London: HMSO, 1950), p.155. 
37
 A search for the report in the private papers of both Professor Sir F. C. Bartlett (Cambridge 
University Library Manuscript Collection) and Sir Edward Mellanby (Wellcome Library, London) 
has also proved fruitless. 
14 
expert in fatigue working at Cambridge University, who came to supervise the 
work of Mackworth.38 
 
Fortunately, Mackworth provided a synopsis of his report to the FPRC’s Sub-
Committee on Airsickness in April 1941, which noted two distinct strands to his 
experiments: first, testing on ratings undertaking physically demanding work; 
and second, testing on officers. Mackworth was able to conclude that 
Benzedrine made no ‘objective’ difference in terms of actual physical output or 
endurance, but the majority of the ratings tested ‘felt better’ when conducting 
physical work under the effects of the drug. In turn, officers felt that Benzedrine 
helped them with fatigue, especially during a lengthy spell on duty. The nature 
of such testing was fairly rudimentary, and a single-blind methodology, criticised 
by Rasmussen as being open to observer bias, was utilised.39 Nonetheless, 
such research was significant because it provided data from the operational 
naval context that formed part of the evidential basis upon which Bartlett 
developed more specific recommendations for the use of Benzedrine.  
Produced in May 1941, Bartlett’s paper, which reached Nicholls at the 
end of May 1941, noted that Benzedrine produced feelings of wellbeing and 
                                                          
38
 TNA, FD 1/5354 – Letter, F. C. Bartlett to Mellanby, 14 May 1941; TNA, FD 1/6377 – Letter, 
MDG to Mellanby, 30 May 1941; TNA, ADM 1/11912 – Minute, MDG 28 November 1940. 
39
 TNA, AIR 57/4 – Minutes of FPRC Sub-Committee on Airsickness, 16 April 1941, pp.1–2; 
Rasmussen, On Speed, p.61. 
15 
increased confidence, that it did not impair judgment or skill, but that it did not 
enhance performance. The drug could help with skill loss due to lack of sleep, 
although it was not a substitute for sleep. Importantly, the ‘majority’ of 
individuals taking the substance would be ‘disposed to try harder to do their 
best’. Bartlett also concluded that the drug was not addictive, but that 
individuals could come to rely on the drug ‘more and more’. Other challenges 
highlighted included the subjective qualities of the substance and difficulties 
sleeping after use.40 
In creating recommendations for the use of the drug, Bartlett stated that 
Benzedrine was only to be used in closely prescribed circumstances, in 
‘abnormally strenuous’ situations of no more than 8 to 12 hours in duration, or at 
the end of a period of prolonged strain lasting 48 hours. Such a situation, in 
which no more than 10 milligrams (mg) of Benzedrine should be used over 12 
hours, needed to be followed by an opportunity for rest and recovery. The drug 
could be utilised once a week at most and was not ‘like a rum-ration’. Bartlett’s 
decision to mention the rum-ration, a hugely significant cultural touchstone for 
the Navy, was clearly designed to emphasis to the naval mind that Benzedrine 
was not for use in anything but exceptional circumstances. In contrast to rum, 
access to the drug was not an ‘inalienable right’ for naval personnel and its 
                                                          
40
 TNA, AIR 57/5 – FPRC Report 308, ‘Benzedrine’, 20 May 1941, pp.1–3; TNA, FD 1/6377 – 
Letter, Mellanby to MDG, 29 May 1941 and Letter, MDG to Mellanby, 30 May 1941. 
16 
issue would be dictated purely by operational conditions; unlike alcohol with its 
historic connections to morale and discipline.41 In this context, Benzedrine use 
was centred on helping personnel at risk of falling asleep due to the sheer 
physical and mental strain of operations rather than as a palliative psychological 
tool.  
In turn, and echoing pre-war concerns that Benzedrine was ‘a drug that 
did many different things to many different people, apparently also in different 
doses’, the substance was never to be used without first providing the individual 
with a pre-operational test dose so as to gauge their reactions to the drug.42 
Mirroring wider societal trends in which access to drugs was placed in the 
hands of medical and pharmacological professionals, control of Benzedrine was 
to be given to MOs or commanding officers who were to be ‘as fully acquainted 
as possible with the properties of the substance’. This helped with issues 
related to harm reduction while serving to shape and control the experience of 
those taking the substance. For Bartlett, the experience of Benzedrine use 
could be shaped by stressing the ‘maximal suggestion effect’, ‘linking its use 
                                                          
41
 J. Pack, Nelson’s Blood: The Story of Naval Rum (Annapolis, M.D.: Naval Institute Press, 
Third Edition, 1996), p.55; N. A. M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian 
Navy (London: Collins, 1986), pp.72–74; N. A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A 
Naval History of Britain, 1649 – 1815 (London: 2006 [2004]), pp.495 – 496; Admiralty, The 
King’s Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, Vol.I: Articles (London 1943), pp.834–836; 
McKee, Sober Men and True, pp.148–160; E. Jones & N. Fear, ‘Alcohol Misuse and Abuse with 
the Military: A Review’, International Review of Psychiatry, 23 (April 2011), p.168.  
42
 ‘Benzedrine Uses and Abuses’, The Lancet, 232, 6010 (5 November 1938), 1062. 
17 
with the efficient performance of the job at hand’.43 By helping to influence the 
psychological outlook of those utilising the drug coupled with the creation of a 
positive and controlled environment in which the substance was to be 
employed, Bartlett’s advice demonstrated that purely pharmacological 
considerations formed only one aspect of the effects of Benzedrine.44  
Bartlett noted that Benzedrine was for use in a situation, ‘calling for 
maintained mental and co-ordinated alertness. It is far more valuable for 
officers, individuals, or small groups of highly skilled personnel.’45 This decision, 
to encourage officers and highly skilled personnel to utilise the drug, developed 
from Mackworth’s conclusions and enshrined in Admiralty policy in C.B.3062, 
was in advance of the conclusions of the other services, and later in the war 
both the British Army and RAF would prohibit the operational use of Benzedrine 
for those ‘required to make important decisions’.46 Bartlett’s position, while 
supported by Mackworth’s experimental data, also reflected operational and 
cultural factors within the RN. For example, officers, especially ship’s captains, 
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played a crucial role in the efficiency and decision making process of a ship; a 
factor clearly stated in King’s Regulations, embedded in naval culture and 
further reflected in the operational experience of naval captains during the 
conflict.47 While Michael Palmer demonstrated the evolution of command and 
control in the naval context, including the influence of rapid technological 
development, the human has remained very much at the centre of this 
increasingly complex command process. As Reeve recorded, ‘[f]atigue and 
stress have always taken their toll on naval commanders, whether as a result of 
the intensity of fleet chases and engagements, the protracted strain of convoy 
duties and blockades…’.48 Thus, should these individuals struggle with 
wakefulness then the safety of ships and their crews were at risk. Moreover, 
given the importance of the ‘interface between people and material’, the safety 
of ships depended on the increasingly sophisticated technological systems 
around which they were built, systems that put significant strain on operators.49  
Thus, in the first recorded example of the operational use of Benzedrine in 
the RN, at least the first example currently in the public domain, these two 
factors clearly affected the decision to employ Benzedrine, with the substance 
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utilised in keeping with Bartlett’s subsequent suggestions. In May 1941, during 
the pursuit of the Bismarck, the MO on the cruiser H.M.S. Norfolk  
 
had a private stock of benzedrine, held for just such an occasion, and 
it certainly came in very useful. During five days and nights there was 
only a single period of some thirty minutes for sleep. I administered 
benzedrine to the Admiral [F. Wake-Walker], the captain [A. J. L. 
Phillips], the flag lieutenant, the gunnery officers and the warrant 
telegraphist all of whom found it most valuable in helping them stay 
awake.50 
 
The use of Benzedrine in this context seemed to support the conclusions put 
forward in Bartlett’s report, including the use of the drug by officers and skilled 
individuals. The example also indicates the relationship between senior officers 
and their MOs, with the latter providing medical support and guidance to the 
former, but with enough latitude to take the initiative with medical practice where 
deemed prudent.51 
Operationally, the example demonstrates the timescales sometimes 
involved in naval engagements, and as Reeve recorded, ‘[w]orking a ship at sea 
is a continuous task whether in action or not … Boredom and fatigue are 
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perennial pitfalls of life at sea’.52 Rear-Admiral Sir Frederic Wake-Walker’s 1st 
Cruiser Squadron (1CS) tracked the Bismarck for many days without respite, 
which included prompts from the Admiralty to pursue the Bismarck more 
aggressively, further reflecting that modern communications technology can 
place even greater strain on commanders who can be disturbed at all hours 
with tactical, operational and strategic intelligence and orders.53 In turn, as 
James Levy observed, an additional pressure was applied to personnel utilising 
new technologies such as radar, which placed significant mental and visual 
strain on operators; technology utilised by ships within Wake-Walker’s 1CS 
during the engagement. Tellingly, in 1944, Mackworth would undertake 
research, which measured visual vigilance among radar operators, including the 
positive effect of Benzedrine on this process.54  
With reference to the RAF, Rasmussen suggested that the unsanctioned 
use of Benzedrine within the organisation placed pressure on the Air Ministry to 
‘take an official position’ on the substance.55 Thus, while the use of the drug 
was not prohibited in the Navy at this point (as it was in the RAF), it may well be 
that ‘bottom-up’ pressure helped focus the Admiralty on the need to issue a 
definitive policy statement on the use of the drug. As Graff noted at an FPRC 
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meeting in August 1941, Bartlett’s paper had been submitted to the Board of the 
Admiralty and to ‘various C-in-C’s and Commanding Officers for opinion and 
decision whether the use of benzedrine was justified’. In late May 1941, Nicholls 
also noted that both Bartlett and Mackworth’s reports would be forwarded to the 
‘right quarter’, likely a reference to the Fourth Sea Lord, responsible for naval 
supply matters and Medical Services at the Admiralty.56 Demonstrating both the 
practical and independent streak in the Admiralty, Graff also commented that 
the former, ‘had told the Medical Department unofficially to buy a stock of the 
drug’.57  
Whether this indicated the Admiralty’s intention to approve operational use 
is unclear, but it seems probable as such approval was given with the 
publication of C.B.3062 in September 1941. Moreover, as ships were instructed 
to carry significant quantities of the drug, sometimes into the tens of thousands 
of tablets per vessel, the Admiralty needed the time to procure adequate 
supplies.58 This also provides evidence of the value the Admiralty placed on 
Benzedrine, and later in the war a Confidential Fleet Order stated that, the  
 
Admiralty have no intention of supplying … medical preparations for 
purposes for which they have no value … Where scientific research 
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shows that real benefit does follow from the use of certain 
preparations every effort will be made to see that those in need of 
them receive them.59  
 
By taking the initiative on the purchase of Benzedrine, the Admiralty was 
sending a clear message as to its feelings about the potential of the substance. 
On publication, C.B.3062 contained not only the Admiralty’s 
recommendations, but a verbatim copy of Bartlett’s May 1941 report. The 
document was widely ‘issued for the instruction and guidance of Commanding 
Officers and Medical Officers’, serving to equip these individuals with the 
knowledge to shape the mind set of service personnel while creating a 
supportive and efficient environmental setting.60 That such guidance was issued 
in a Confidential Booklet offers some indication as to the sensitivity of the 
subject and wider issues relating to harm reduction and a desire to restrict 
Benzedrine use to ‘exceptional circumstances’. In turn, the Admiralty’s only 
nuance to Bartlett’s initial feedback, although a major addition, was that 
Benzedrine use was only to be approved in ships that carried an MO. This was 
presumably to ensure that real-time medical supervision was available, 
including for the conduct of the initial pre-operational testing; the latter a 
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prerequisite for the use of the drug on operations.61 The wider legal context was 
also relevant and the Admiralty and its ships were not exempt from the 
implications of civilian law when it came to the storage, distribution and use of 
dangerous drugs. While Benzedrine was not controlled under the Dangerous 
Drugs Act and its various amendments, Benzedrine tablets were subject to a 
level of control via an Amendment (1938) to the Poisons List, and they were 
only to be distributed via medical or pharmacological professionals. Although 
the drug was not mentioned specifically in King’s Regulations, the latter made 
clear MO obligations relating to the control and dispensing of poisons in the 
Service.62 
 
While the development of Benzedrine policy to this point did involve specific 
naval research and administrative effort, the RN was fortunate to be able to 
draw on the work of, and be supported by, the MRC, the FPRC and researchers 
in the British Army. However, in the context of survival at sea, where 
Benzedrine was deemed to have some potential, the Navy was compelled to 
take a more central role in research. This process crystallised opinion in the 
Navy about the need for a personnel research committee, and the creation of 
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the MRC’s Committee on the Care of Shipwrecked Personnel was an important 
step on this journey. The latter, created in September 1941 by the MRC at the 
request of the Admiralty, was, as Coulter acknowledged, given impetus by 
operational developments; in this instance increased losses at sea due to U-
Boat operations.63 The Committee, which examined ‘physiological problems 
affecting survival on rafts or in open boats’, established a dedicated sub-
committee to consider the use of Benzedrine ‘energy tablets’.64  
The conclusions of this sub-committee were seemingly unique in the 
wider Benzedrine policy of Britain’s armed forces, as they were the first to 
openly recommend the use of the substance based largely on its wellbeing 
related effects. As Dudley minuted, the use of Benzedrine ‘would lead to the 
mitigation of suffering and sometimes to the prolongation of survival’. The latter 
was a reference to the wakefulness / endurance related effects of the drug, but 
the former was based on Benzedrine’s euphoric effects.65 As Reeve observed, 
‘[d]eath when it came in boats or rafts, came slowly and could involve mental as 
well as physical disintegration and collapse’.66 Thus, as Dudley continued, in 
such ‘desperate … circumstances’, the potential for abuse, already small, 
balanced any issues relating to potential harm, and it could be argued that 
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Benzedrine use in this context was to help shipwrecked survivors transition from 
one world to the next, making their last hours and days a more pleasant / 
manageable experience. Careful not to overstate, Dudley and the Sub-
Committee noted that their conclusions were based in the realms of the 
theoretical as ‘direct experiment could not be undertaken’. Dudley concluded by 
noting that while valuable, the importance of Benzedrine in this context was 
‘slight in compared with other measures such as adequate water and protection 
from cold, heat and immersion’.67 
While the use of Benzedrine in this context was supported in principle, 
practical and logistical issues prevented the widespread issue and use of the 
drug until at least mid-1944.68 Such difficulties centred on the supply of a 
suitable container for the substance, which needed to balance a robust, 
waterproof and easy to open design while taking up minimal space in the 
already replete survival rafts and floats found on ships.69 Lengthy and detailed 
correspondence exists on the subject with exchanges between the Admiralty 
and E. Griffiths Hughes Limited, the supplier selected to provide the drug and its 
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container.70 Of this correspondence, two issues stand out as particularly 
relevant: first, the Admiralty decided to purchase a generic version of 
amphetamine sulphate as opposed to Benzedrine, the proprietary article 
version supplied in the UK by Menley and James. As Bennett and Bennett 
observed, ship owners were usually responsible for supplying medical or safety 
equipment for merchant vessels, but in the case of Benzedrine, the Ministry for 
War Transport felt it the duty of the state to provide such drugs; hence a desire 
to reduce costs. This decision reflected not only the importance placed on the 
drug, but also the value of providing the substance in secure and adequately 
labelled containers so it could be used safely on operations.71 The latter was to 
be achieved by retaining centralised control over the ordering and distribution of 
the drug, and the RN supplied amphetamine sulphate to combat and merchant 
shipping during 1944 and into 1945. This demonstrated the significance 
attached to the substance, and the wider global reach, scale and impact of 
Britain’s maritime activities.72 
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Second, a legal issue was raised in the production of the packaging for 
the amphetamine sulphate, and Griffiths Hughes noted that in abiding by the 
Poisons and Pharmacy Act (1933) the word ‘poison’ should be included on the 
container of the drug. The Admiralty was aware of its responsibilities in this 
regard, highlighted in King’s Regulations, but in responding to Griffiths Hughes 
it noted that it would take responsibility for omitting the ‘usual markings’.73 While 
not providing reasoning for such logic, it could be that the decision to omit the 
word ‘poison’ was driven by a desire to maximise the ‘suggestive’ effect of the 
drug. In a time of crisis, the word ‘poison’ may have affected the mind set of an 
individual by creating an ambiguous or negative feeling toward a substance that 
when used under clearly defined conditions was supposed to be beneficial. 
More generally, the Director of Naval Personnel (DNP) noted that the reading of 
printed instructions was not ideal in what would be an adverse survival situation. 
As such, he instructed that MOs were to brief ship’s companies on the use of 
the drug in case of emergency.74 Agreeing with the DNP, Dudley noted that 
printed instructions remained a useful ‘adjunct’ to instruction by MOs, 
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particularly as the drug could be supplied to ships, including those of the 
Merchant Navy, where MOs were not present.75  
Such instructions, appearing in an MRC publication of January 1943, 
were to be included in life rafts and floats, and they were also to be studied by 
officers and MOs within both the RN and merchant fleet; a point re-emphasised 
in Fleet Orders of June 1944. While criticising the late-arrival of this document, 
coming as it did after peak merchant losses were experienced, Bennett and 
Bennett praised the ‘comprehensive and authoritative’ nature of the pamphlet.76 
In terms of amphetamine use, the instructions emphasised that the drug should 
be controlled by the officer or rating in command of the lifeboat / raft, and that 
the former should be aware of the proprieties of the drug and the situations in 
which its use may prove beneficial. As with the conclusions of the Benzedrine 
Sub-Committee, the value of the drug in terms of both wakefulness and 
wellbeing was emphasised alongside its potentially subjective and negative 
effects. This included the drug’s ability to ‘raise the spirits, and prolong the will 
to “hang on” and live’. However, in contrast to C.B.3062, the MRC’s instructions 
emphasised the risks of the drug in a less worrisome tone: ‘[a] few people feel 
worse or become excitable after the tablets. This is not a serious matter, but 
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such people should be given no more. The majority feel better for them.’ Again, 
the goal appeared to be to offer clear instruction, reduce the potential for harm 
and create a positive mind set if the drug needed to be utilised; gaining 
maximum suggestive effect from the substance. As with the wider operational 
sphere, amphetamines were only to be used in ‘severe’ situations or situations 
where a ‘special effort was necessary’.77  
 
The work of the Shipwreck Committee was praised for its careful review of the 
available evidence, its rediscovery of a large amount of prior research, its 
coordinating role and its ability to utilise experts to overturn ‘many false and 
harmful superstitions’. This set the tone for cooperative medical research inside 
the Navy, and in parallel to the work on survival at sea, key figures in the MRC 
and RN continued to discuss the importance of developing the latter’s ability to 
coordinate and direct research relating to naval personnel. As Coulter recorded, 
a feeling existed that, ‘there were appearing naval requirements which could not 
be solved adequately and expeditiously by the existing organisation’. Coupled 
with the pressures placed on the MDG and the Medical Department, support for 
the creation of a RNPRC gathered pace during this period.78  
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In writing to the Scientific Department at the Admiralty in December 
1941, Mellanby noted that in spite of some useful cooperation between the 
Navy and the existing personnel research committees, a failure to develop a 
specific naval committee, supported by the MRC, was a ‘great pity’ given the 
expertise possessed by the latter in terms of personnel research. Mellanby 
stressed a similar point to Dudley before the end of the year and again 
suggested the creation of a RNPRC. In responding, Dudley, who had taken 
over the post of MDG from Nicholls, hinted the latter was a factor in the failure 
to create a naval specific committee, while Dudley also noted the poor 
cooperation that existed between the post of MDG and that of Director of 
Scientific Research (DSR). Commenting upon the important work conducted by 
scientific and medical researchers in the RN, Dudley, supported by Mellanby, 
felt that a ‘greater degree of contact’ was required. This exchange 
demonstrated the far from harmonious relations that existed between scientific 
and medical researchers in the RN, and in a letter of February 1942, Dudley 
noted that great tact was required in developing policy as ‘these semi-
independent bodies and individuals all tend to be rather jealous of their 
positions and have established certain vested interests’.79 
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In various minutes between MDG, DSR and the Director of Training and 
Staff Duties (DTSD), a certain tension was in evidence, but Dudley’s support for 
the RNPRC, driven by his concerns over a lack of coordination and the role of 
‘well-meaning “amateurs”’, provided decisive impetus.80 Taking practical steps, 
Mellanby approached Dr E. A. Carmichael, an individual who had undertaken 
important Benzedrine related work for the FPRC, to propose an outline for the 
scope and focus of the RNPRC; a proposal that included an examination of 
‘analeptic substances’ such as Benzedrine.81 Viewing Mellanby as the natural 
chair of the RNPRC, Dudley made an informal approach in June 1942, which 
was confirmed in October 1942.82 With a proposed chair in place and an outline 
scheme provided by Carmichael, Dudley drew up more concrete plans, which 
were forwarded to the Second Sea Lord in July 1942. The less tactful 
references to amateurism had been removed, but in recommending the creation 
of the RNPRC, Dudley emphasised the increasingly complex problems faced by 
naval medical researchers, the lack of research training and expertise 
possessed by RN MOs and the desire to coordinate these efforts while drawing 
on the support – both administrative and technical – of the MRC.83 With 
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Admiralty approval for Dudley’s plan, the newly created RNPRC met for the first 
time in November 1942.84 
Given that the remit of the Committee included a focus on the ‘fighting 
efficiency’ of naval personnel, it was unsurprising that the use of amphetamines 
was discussed by the RNPRC during 1943. However, it was wider MRC 
discussions about Benzedrine during August 1942 that saw the Navy reflect 
upon the implications of C.B.3062. In an undated paper submitted to Winston 
Churchill as Minister of Defence, the Admiralty noted that C.B.3062 offered only 
general recommendations for the use of the drug. No reports had reached the 
Admiralty of use in operational conditions, except in some limited instances of 
sea-sickness, and while it was noted that due to indiscriminate use German 
forces were restricting their use of amphetamines on operations, the Admiralty 
still felt ‘properly handled, benzedrine would prove of service. The publication 
issued to the Fleet [C.B.3062] probably errs on the side of caution.’85 This was 
an important distinction, and while Rasmussen cited the German decision to 
scale back on amphetamine use as evidence of problems with the substance, 
Stephen Snelders and Toine Peters have challenged this argument suggesting 
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that the control of the drug was driven by social and legal pressures; contexts 
very different in the case of Britain and the RN.86  
The implications of the Admiralty’s paper indicated that even though 
C.B.3062 had provided approval for the use of Benzedrine, the practical 
constraints of policy had limited the opportunities to use the drug on operations. 
Approval of the drug in survival at sea situations was also recorded, but the 
policy statement indicated the Admiralty felt further reflection on Benzedrine 
was required. Additional evidence relating to Benzedrine reached the Admiralty 
via Dudley in August 1942, who had been appointed as a member of the 
Military Personnel Research Committee’s (MPRC) Sub-Committee on Analeptic 
Substances. The Sub-Committee’s report restated and generally amplified 
existing research on Benzedrine: that it was useful in terms of wakefulness and 
tiredness, but it was not a substitute for sleep, that it was not to be used 
regularly and that control of administration should be retained by MOs. 
Importantly, the report appeared to challenge a key recommendation of 
C.B.3062, and in contrast with the Norfolk example, it was noted that, ‘a dose of 
10mgm. should not be taken by a man in a position of authority or a position 
where decisions of importance must be made’. A lesser dose of 5mg could be 
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taken, with a further dose after an interval of four to six hours, but only if the 
individual had ‘previous experience of the drug and suffered no ill-effects 
therefrom’.87 This advice, serving to confirm the RAF’s policy of total prohibition, 
was interpreted strictly in the British Army with restrictions on the use of 
Benzedrine for those in positions of authority. However, by the end of 
November 1942, the RAF finally decided to approve the use of Benzedrine by 
aircrews on operations, including those in decision making positions – pilots and 
navigators.88  
The restrictive application of amphetamine policy in the RN may have 
been shaped by the knowledge that ship’s captains were responsible for the 
safety of an entire ship’s company. If an adverse reaction to the drug was 
experienced, and C.B.3062 did not discount the possibility, hundreds of lives 
and an extremely valuable naval asset may have been jeopardised. In contrast, 
RAF policy, while the product of a more extensive period of testing and 
development, reflected more favourable operational circumstances for use of 
the drug. For example, bomber crews could generally use Benzedrine on 
operations safe in the knowledge that they would enjoy a period of rest on 
return from a sortie. Moreover, an adverse reaction in the skies, while 
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potentially life-threatening, was, on balance, perhaps a more acceptable risk 
given that the loss of an aircrew represented a much smaller net casualty than a 
ship’s company. Stressing the limitations of the drug and educating aircrews 
about safe and efficient use, the RAF considered that such risks were 
outweighed by the benefits of providing amphetamine to aircrew to promote 
wakefulness on the hazardous return leg of an operation. In the context of the 
British Army, while testing and policy development was also more thorough than 
in the RN, operational factors in the land environment were not without 
problems. In similar fashion to the maritime setting, it was difficult to predict the 
end of an operation, making it challenging to select the optimal moment to 
deploy the drug in battle and almost impossible to guarantee soldiers adequate 
periods of rest after amphetamine use. Nonetheless, the high attrition rates 
experienced by infantry units in North Africa, Italy and Normandy – all theatres 
in which the British Army utilised amphetamines – may have served to mitigate 
the War Office’s concerns about the drug.89 
The RAF’s decision to utilise the drug on operations, discussed at the 
FPRC, prompted Graff to reveal that certain reports had been received about 
Benzedrine use in the naval context, including the use of the drug during a 
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Russian convoy where Benzedrine was given to ‘certain key officers and men 
… [who] could not have stood up to the strain without it’. Captain Richard 
Oliver-Bellasis, appointed as a member of the FPRC as part of Admiralty / Air 
Ministry discussions in mid-1941, felt that it was time to revisit C.B.3062 given 
its restrictive nature. Oliver-Bellasis felt a relaxation of Benzedrine policy was 
required, encouraging the experimental use of the drug, as he felt the ‘Navy 
might be missing the use of valuable aid’. At a meeting of the MPRC the 
following day, Dudley may have ‘found it difficult in assessing the value of the 
drug’, but this did not stop strategic and operational pressures making the use 
of Benzedrine a more pressing matter.90  
Graff’s mention of a Russian convoy was particularly apposite, and as 
Jones and Greenberg have recorded, naval operations in the Arctic theatre saw 
a ‘significant number of stress-related disorders’, reflecting the operational 
conditions experienced. As Coulter observed, these included the extreme 
temperature, lengthy periods on watch and repeated air attacks. Operational 
factors also exposed wider strategic pressures and at the end of 1942, the 
Board of the Admiralty reflected on the significant difficulties experienced by the 
RN, including heavy merchant losses and a lack of warships, material and 
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human resources.91 These strategic and operational considerations helped 
shape the activities of the RNPRC, and in January 1943 the Committee 
reported that Critchley was to be made available to conduct experimental and 
observational work with Russian convoys.92 Critchley’s report, submitted to the 
RNPRC in April 1943 and given wide circulation in the RN, was based upon his 
sailing with HMS Kent as part of the outbound convoy, JW 52, and HMS 
Matchless as part of the inbound convoy, RA 52; both operations taking place 
between mid-January and early February 1943.93  
In his report, Critchley stated some of the more common factors affecting 
performance on such convoys, including weather, lack of light, boredom 
interspersed with intense and sometimes lengthy attacks and further strain on 
personnel utilising a range of technological equipment. In moving to discuss 
Benzedrine, Critchley noted that there was ‘a fairly widespread mistrust of the 
use of such a drug even in cases of emergency, mainly on account of its 
anticipated after-effects’. It is unclear whether this was based on wider 
prejudices about the use of drugs, via the ‘rather strict limitations’ contained in 
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C.B.3062 or because of the experience of utilising the substance on operations. 
In suggesting several scenarios for which the drug might prove useful, including 
use by officers and technical specialists on extended watches or during periods 
of extended action, Critchley noted that three problems were evident: the 
uncertain length of operation, the possibility of an adverse reaction and the 
‘unsafe or unwise’ practice to make repeated use of the drug over an extended 
period.94  
While disputed by Pugh, both Rasmussen and Francis have suggested 
that the RAF used Benzedrine as a frontline psychiatric tool, and it is tempting 
to attribute its use in the RN along similar lines.95 Reference to the use of the 
drug to help with ‘fatigue’ or ‘strain’ complicates this process as both terms had 
inherently ambiguous meanings, with the former appropriated by the RN in 
1943 as an institutionally acceptable term for those experiencing ‘anxiety 
states’.96 However, it is telling that, even with comments on both the mental and 
physical strain of those undertaking convoying work, Critchley’s discussion of 
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Benzedrine focused heavily on wakefulness and alertness as opposed to the 
desire to make use of the drug for its euphoric or wellbeing related effects.97 
Critchley’s report was discussed by the RNPRC in May 1943, 
commented on by DTSD in the same month, and subsequently forwarded to 
MDG. In turn, the RNPRC meeting of 1 June 1943 recommended that MDG 
produce an addendum to C.B.3062 with the aim of relaxing restrictions to 
provide approval for the use of Benzedrine in Coastal Forces and small ships 
where MOs were not present. Indeed, in an earlier report about the RN’s 
Coastal Forces – its small craft such as Motor Torpedo Boats – submitted to the 
RNPRC in January 1943, a call had been made for providing information and 
guidance about the use of Benzedrine. As Graff noted at an RNPRC meeting on 
19 January, medical supervision for Coastal Forces was part of a wider issue 
highlighted in the report, although as a further RNPRC report indicated, there 
was little enthusiasm for the use of Benzedrine in Coastal Forces.98 
Although newly commissioned RN MOs were still actively encouraged to 
familiarise themselves with the proprieties and potential of Benzedrine, naval 
policy was not amended again during the conflict. In fact, the content of 
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C.B.3062 remained unchanged into the post-war period, when in 1946, it was 
reissued in declassified form as part of the Book of Reference (BR) series.99 
Thus, in spite of Critchley’s evidence and the opinions of members of both the 
FPRC and RNPRC and the Navy’s pioneering role in terms of Benzedrine 
policy, the limitations imposed on the utilisation of amphetamines saw the RN 
possess perhaps the most restrictive policy of Britain’s armed forces during the 
Second World War.100 
 
Given the duration of naval operations and the demands placed on naval 
personnel, the RN was attracted to Benzedrine by the promise that it would help 
its personnel sustain wakefulness, information highlighted by Mellanby. The 
work of Mackworth provided some important naval-specific operational data, 
although this lacked the breadth and depth of similar efforts in the British Army 
and RAF. Nonetheless, Bartlett was able to utilise even this limited information, 
in conjunction with civilian sources and additional evidence from other MRC 
studies, to establish some cautious and positive guidance for the use of the 
drug during combat operations. His decision to compare Benzedrine use to the 
issue of the rum-ration was a clear indication of the very different functions and 
effects of these drugs. Bartlett’s guidance was so influential that it was issued 
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by the Admiralty verbatim as part of C.B.3062, although with the addendum 
ensuring that the drug should only be issued on ships that possessed an MO; 
the latter providing real-time support and supervision. 
The guidance contained in C.B.3062 was sensible, well-intentioned and 
ground breaking. A desire to provide clear and positive guidance for MOs and 
ship’s captains was part of what could be seen as a progressive educational 
agenda aimed at harm reduction and the promotion of the efficient use of the 
drug on operations. However, the operational circumstances under which 
Benzedrine use was permitted appeared to be overly cautious. Some of these 
restrictions, based on length of operations and availability of adequate periods 
of rest, were prudent and were not unique to the RN. Yet, the rapidity with which 
C.B.3062 was issued, in comparison to the lengthier process of policy creation 
in the RAF, for example, suggests the Admiralty should have been more 
thorough and less hurried during the gestation period. The pace at which such 
policy was issued and the manner in which the Admiralty actively pursued the 
acquisition of amphetamines provides an interesting paradox with the restrictive 
nature of the practical aspects of its policy. Whether this pace was driven by the 
‘bottom-up’ use of the substance is unclear, but the example of H.M.S. Norfolk 
indicates a level of independent awareness about the drug driven by the wider 
media / medical profile of Benzedrine. 
42 
The evolution of the Navy’s Benzedrine policy also illustrates wider 
organisational issues relating to the conduct and coordination of medical 
research in the service. The creation of the Shipwrecked Personnel Committee 
demonstrated the virtues of a dedicated committee that could coordinate the 
efforts of medical and scientific researchers in the RN while drawing on external 
support from the MRC. Coming into existence when the RN was facing strategic 
and operational challenges, especially in the context of convoy operations, the 
RNPRC helped catalyse further discussions on amphetamines. However, in 
spite of positive recommendations to modify the content of C.B.3062, no 
amendments were forthcoming. Calls for further research in November 1942 
and again in May 1943 demonstrate that the RN needed to have undertaken a 
systematic process of operational experimentation before issuing C.B.3062. 
Such data, however rudimentary, would have only served to strengthen the 
organisation’s understanding of the drug and to boost faith in the substance by 
MOs, ship’s captains and personnel using amphetamines in the operational 
context. 
In terms of motivations, amphetamine use in the RN was governed by 
considerations relating to both wakefulness and wellbeing, and the example of 
the use of the drug in the survival at sea context provides a positive illustration 
of an organisation approving the use of the substance based in part on its 
43 
euphoric effects. The decision to recommend the provision of amphetamines 
based purely on its theoretical potential reflected not only the desperate 
circumstances that could face shipwrecked personnel, but also the genuine 
promise attached to the drug. An agreement to provide the substance to the 
merchant fleet, at cost to the British government, offers further evidence in this 
regard. Wider motivations for use during combat operations are more opaque, 
especially in comparison to the RAF, and there are genuine complications when 
the language of strain and fatigue are considered. Nonetheless, the value of 
amphetamines as an aid to wakefulness appears to be the primary driver in the 
RN’s decision to approve the use of the drug on operations. 
